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tion of certain cases of homicide wherein it had turned out that by
reason of a failure of the prosecutor to prove the death of the person
charged as having been murdered, it so happened that such person
sometimes survived the person accused as his murderer.7 The reasoning
in an earlier lower court case was that the rule was based on the danger
incident to convictions of persons charged with crime when no crime
was in fact committed.'
The rule applied in the principal case would not have been effective
if the defendant had either plead guilty or made a confession in open
court. The court in State v. Ferranto9 held that a plea of guilty in a
capital offense should be accepted cautiously and the trial judge should
fully advise the accused of his rights and be satisfied that he acts freely
after being so advised. This illustrates the desire on the part of courts
to protect the defendant but there is no rule requiring that there be
evidence introduced to establish the corpus delicti before the plea of
guilty or the confession in open court will be permitted. It would seem
that the reason usually given for the rule as to admissibility of extra-
judicial confessions would also be present in judicial confessions and
pleas of guilty.'" Although some courts in other states have held that
the rule of the principal case does not obtain where the confession was
that of a misdemeanor, 1 there is no indication that the rule will be
so modified in Ohio. R.L.R.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
RIGHT OF ADOPTED CHILD TO INHERIT THROUGH
ITS ADOPTIVE PARENTS
In an action to determine heirship brought by the administrator of
the estate of Ella Saxby, deceased, where the rival claimants were a
first cousin of the deceased and a designated heir of a brother of the
deceased, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Common Pleas Court in
holding that a designated heir can inherit from but not through the
declarant.' In support of this holding the court in a dictum draws an
analogy to the adoption statute, Ohio G.C. Sec. 10512-19.
'State v. Maranda, 940 Ohio St. 364 at 370, 114 N.E. 1038 (19o6); cited supra
note State v. Wehr, 6 Ohio N.P. 345, 9 Ohio Dec. 4S9 (898).
State of Ohio v. Ferranto, xiz Ohio St. 667, 148 N.E. 36z (1925).
' However on this point see Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 13448-z, which reads: " . . . If
the offense charged is murder and the accused is convicted by confession in open court,
the court shall examine the witnesses, determine the degree of the crime and pronounce
sentence accordingly."
'See 22 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, sec. 839, p. 147Z (1940).
'Southern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Boyer, 66 Ohio App. 136, 31 N.E.
(2d) x6i, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 6z6 (1940).
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.The general trend of adoption legislation has been to make the rela-
tionship between adoptive parent and adopted child more closely resem-
ble the natural parent-child relationship. The growth of the Ohio
adoption statute is indicative of that trend.' However with respect to
inheritance by the adopted child through the adoptive parent the prog-
ress along this line has been hampered by the strict construction of the
courts. Thus at the present time a majority of jurisdictions follows the
rule that an adopted child cannot inherit through its adoptive parent,'
but there is a sizeable minority opposed to that position.4 Since the
statutes in each jurisdiction vary as to wording any comparison on the
basis of majority or minority rule lends little support to either view.
Behind this strict construction lies the principle that consanguinity is
favored in the determination of heirship. To allow an adopted child,
who is a stranger to the blood line, to inherit property from the ancestors
and collateral relatives of the adoptive parent is not consonant with the
general rules of inheritance.
The reported cases involving General Code sec. 10512-i9 are not
numerous. Of the decisions which have referred to that statute the
principal case is representative. The court there indicates that should the
occasion arise it would construe it as not having changed the rule that
an adopted child can inherit from but not through the adoptive parent.
In support of this the court cites several Supreme Court cases.' Since
all of these were decided before the passage of the present statute it
would seem that they are no longer authority on this point.6 Neverthe-
less the principal case does not stand alone in its view. Adhering to the
same proposition is Reinhard v. Reinhard,' which is a direct holding that
adopted children cannot take as issue of a parent of their adoptive parent
where the testator's will devised property to the "issue" of such person.
In Rogers v. Miller,' a trust deed was involved and the adopted children
were not permitted to take as children of the settlor's deceased son,
their adoptive parent, but the court there indicates that the rights of the
'See Ohio G.C. sec. ioSiz-i9, Ohio G.C. sec. 8030, Revised Statutes sec. 3540.
a38 A.L.R. 8; i2o A.L.R. 837; 1 Am. JOR. 663; ATxiNsON, HANDBOOK OF TIlE
LAW OF WILLS (1937) p. 68; MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) p. 36z.
4 id.
'Albright v. Albright, iz6 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 76o (19Z7); Phillips v. Mc-
Conica, 59 Ohio St. I, 5x N.E. 445 (1898); Quigley v. Mitchell, 41 Ohio St. 375
(1884); Upson v. Noble, 35 Ohio St. 655 (i88o). But see Shearer Adm. v. Gasstman,
s5 Ohio L. Abs. 103, 31 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) z 9 0933) , which is a Probate Court
decision allowing an adopted child to inherit through its adoptive parent.
'Ohio G.C. sec. iossz-sg, effective Jan. I, 1932, contains words designed to over-
come the effect of these decisions. See note 16 infra.
23 Ohio L. Abs. 306 (1936).
843 Ohio App. 198, 18z N.E. 654 (1932).
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adopted children were fixed under General Code sec. 8030 which was
still in effect at the time of the adoption.' Two other cases are of
interest in this connection. Smith v. Hunter," which was decided before
the enactment of General Code sec. IO512-I9, allowed adopted chil-
dren of the life tenant to take as remaindermen where the limitation
over was to the "heirs at law" of the life tenant. This holding was
reaffirmed in a more recent case involving the same problem. 1 Of
course these two cases have been distinguished on the ground that the
adopted child takes directly from the testator and not through the
adoptive parents. Still the ever recurring objection that the adopted
child is a stranger to the blood, which operates so effectively to prevent
an adopted child from inheriting through its adoptive parent, would
also seem to be a valid objection here.
Due to the complexity of the rules governing the construction of
statutes it is impossible to say with certainty that the statute has been
misinterpreted. However, there are some well recognized principles of
statutory construction which would seemingly lead to a different inter-
pretation. Without considering whether adoption statutes derogate from
or completely change the common law, 2 it is dear that the old rule
of construction that statutes in derogation of the common law shall be
strictly construed has no application to the third or Remedial Part of
the Ohio General Code." Undoubtedly the primary objective in con-
struing any statute is to give effect to the legislative intent.' 4 As an aid
in determining this the court may resort to the journals of the Legis-
lature and will give effect to any manifest intent appearing therein.' 5
When the former Ohio G.C. sec. 8030 was repealed by the present
adoption statute the following words were added to the then existing
adoption law: (referring to the adopted child) "but shall be capable of
inheriting property expressly limited by will or by operation of law to
the child or children, heir or heirs at law, or next of kin, of the adopting
'Ohio G.C. sec. 8030 repealed by Ohio G.C. sec. zOSm1-i9.
"'86 Ohio St. xo6, 99 N.E. 91 (1912).
"Hummel v. Davis, zz Ohio L. Abs. 49 (1936).
2s i Am . JUR. p. 6zs notes x8 and g.
" Ohio G.C. sec. 10214: "The provisions of part third and all proceedings under it,
hall be liberally construed, in order to promote its object, and assist the parties in obtain-
ing justice. The rule of common law, that statutes in derogation thereof must be strictly
construed has no application to such part; but this section shall not be so construed as
to require a liberal construction of provisions affecting personal liberty, relating to
amercement, or of a penal nature."
"See authorities cited note 15 infra.
'Toledo v. Public Utilities Commission, 135 Ohio St. 57, 61, 59 N.E. (zd) 16z,
13 Ohio Op. 329 (1939); Caldwell v. State, isx5 Ohio St. 458, 466, 54 N.E. 792
(19z6); State cx red Davis v. Hildebrant, 94 Ohio St. I54, 165, 114 N.E. 55 (1916);
State cx rel Construction Co. v. Rabbitts, 46 Ohio St. 178, z81, s9 N.E. 437 (1889);
State ex rel Peters v. McCollister, i Ohio 46, SS (184).
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parent or parents, or to a class including any of the foregoing."' 6 Ac-
cording to the comments and source notes of the Special Committee of
the Ohio State Bar Association which drafted this statute and recom-
mended it for passage these words were added for the express purpose
of permitting the adopted child to inherit not only from but also through
the adopting parents." Under the present construction of the adoption
statute the addition of the above quoted words has made no change in
the Ohio law, yet ordinarily it is presumed that every amendment is for
the purpose of effecting some change." As indicated above, the Supreme
Court'has already construed General Code sec. 8030 as not giving the
adopted child the right to inherit through its adoptive parent." Four
years later the Ohio Legislature repealed that section and replaced it
with the present General Code sec. 10512-19- Where the Legislature
repeals a law soon after its construction by the courts there is a pre-
sumption that it intended to counteract the effect of such interpretation."0
The provisions of General Code sec. I0512-19 are broad and aim
to place the adopted child on a par with natural born children by
divesting the natural parents of all legal rights and obligations due from
them to the child, and from the child to them, and transferring these
legal rights and obligations to the adoptive parents. More specifically
the adoptive parents are invested with the legal right to obedience and
maintenance on the part of the child, and in turn the adopted child is
invested with every right, privilege and obligation in respect to educa-
tion, maintenance and rights of inheritance as if born in lawful wedlock.
The only limitations provided for are: First, an adoptive child is not
capable of inheriting property expressly limited to the heirs of the body
of the adopting parents; Second, that on the death of the adopted child
without issue, property which came to it from its adopting parents shall
descend to the next of kin of the adopting parents, rather than to the
next of kin of the adopted child. The rights and privileges referred to
in the statute include property rights as well as personal rights. 2' By
way of comparison it is significant that the statute dealing with the
"°With the exception of the first sentence of former Ohio G.C. sec. 8030 which
now appears in Ohio G.C. sec. oS12-xS8, all of that former statute was included in Ohio
G.C. sec. 10512-19 and the above quoted words were added.
'See comments under Ohio G.C. 10512-19.
'Lytle v. Baldinger, 84. Ohio St. 1, 8, 9S N.E. 389, Ann. Cases 1912B 894 (agiz);
Ohio Valley Electric Ry. Co. v. Hagerty, 14 Ohio App. 398, 402, 32 Ohio C.A. 145
(1921); 37 OHIO JUR. p. 768; 25 R.C.L. ioSs.
"See note S supra.
' State ex rel McCrehen v. Brown, so Ohio St. 454, 458, 141 N.E. 69 (1923).
'Kroff v. Arnhein, 94 Ohio St. 28±, 114 N.E. 267 (1916). See note 27 infra.
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effect on a will of afterborn or pretermitted heirs22 and the one regard-
ing bequests to charitable purposes,23 both expressly place adopted chil-
dren on an equal footing with those who are natural born. However,
it should be noted that adopted children are not referred to in the "lapse
statute" which allows the issue of a devisee or legatee who predeceases
the testator to take the devise as the devisee would have, had he survived
the testator." Under an old Ohio case the word "issue" as used in that
statute had a very technical meaning and did not include adopted chil-
dren,2' but the more recent cases have not so limited the meaning of
that word.2 Statutory changes probably account for this difference.
Certainly the wording of General Code sec. 10512-19 appears to be
broad enough to bring adopted children within the scope of the word
"issue."
The social desirability of encouraging adoptions by according to
adopted children a position of equality is unquestionable. The legal
effect of this is summarized in General Code sec. 10512-19. As pointed
out above, this provision does place two limitations upon the adopted
child's right of inheritance. It might be urged that the mention of
these limitations is exclusive of all others.2" Even without that rule of
construction as an aid, it is submitted that the dictum in the principal
case, to the effect that an adopted child cannot inherit through its adop-
tive parent, is contrary to the express wording of the statute, and that
it is based upon authority which has been superseded."
J. P.M.
' Ohio G.C. sec. 1oo4-49 allows a child who is adopted by the testator after he
has made his will, to take a proportionate share in absence of an expression of intent to
disinherit the adopted child.
' Ohio G.C. sec. o50o4-5. This statute invalidates bequests for charitable purposes
if made within one year of the testator's death, and an adopted child or its lineal
de~scendants may have the benefit of such an invalid bequest.
"' Ohio G.C. sec. 0504-73.
'Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. a, 51 N.E. 445 (x898), cited noted 5 supra.
"'The case of Cochrcl v. Robison, 13 Ohio St. Sz6, x49 N.E. 871 (9zs), holds
that a declarant who dies leaving only a designated heir does not die without issue
within the meaning of the "half and half statute," former Ohio G.C. sec. 8577 now
Ohio G.C. sec. o5o3-5. Miller v. Shepard, 29 Ohio App. 22, 16z N.E. 788 (1928)j is
a similar case holding that the deceased who left surviving him an adopted child did not
die without issue within the meaning of the "half and half statute." In Hlarrison v.
Hillegas, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 404, 13 Ohio Op. 523, the court considers an adopted child as
an sue of the adopting parent in applying the "lapse statute" note 24 supr.
'tRansom v. The New York Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co., 93 Ohio St. 223,
ixz N.E. 586, L.R.A. 19x6E 704 (9S); Kroff v. Arnhein, 94 Ohio St. aSz, 1s4 N.E.
267 (1916). The cases cited here and in note zs supra were decided before the passage
of Ohio G.C. sec. io1z-i9, but they are based upon provisions in former Ohio G.C.
sec. 8030 which have been reenacted in the present statute.
'But see Note (1938) 4 011o ST. L.J. 97.
